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1 Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of secret com-
munication over a Compound Multiple Access Channel (MAC).
In this channel, we assume that one of the transmitted messages
is confidential that is only decoded by its corresponding receiver
and kept secret from the other receiver. For this proposed setting
(compound MAC with confidential messages), we derive general
inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region. Also, as
examples, we investigate ’Less noisy’ and ’Gaussian’ versions of
this channel, and extend the results of the discrete memoryless
version to these cases. Moreover, providing numerical examples
for the Gaussian case, we illustrate the comparison between
achievable rate regions of compound MAC and compound MAC
with confidential messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wire-tap channel was first introduced by Wyner in
1975 [1]. His model consisted of a transmitter, a receiver
and an eavesdropper. In the Wyner model, the eavesdropper
channel was a degraded version of the legitimate receiver
channel. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner extended the wire-tap channel to
a more generalized model called the broadcast channel with
confidential message [2]. More recently, sending a confidential
message over multiple-user channels have been studied under
various different models [3]–[8]. We also refer the reader to
[9] for a recent survey of the research progress in this area.
The discrete memoryless compound Multiple Access Channel
(MAC), Gaussian compound MAC with a common message
and conferencing decoders, and also the compound MAC
when both encoders and decoders cooperate via conferencing
links were considered in [10].
In [3] the authors studied the effect of users’ cooperation
in multiple access channel when transmitting a confidential
message. There, active cooperation between two trusted users
is attained through a generalized feedback channel. In [4] a
discrete memoryless multiple access channel with confidential
messages was studied where each user uses the output of
generalized feedback to eavesdrop the other user’s private
message. Ekrem and Ulukus derived n-letter inner and outer
bounds for the multiple access wire-tap channel with no
common message [5]. In [7], the authors studied this model
assuming that there exists a common message and that the
eavesdropper is unable to decode it. They also derived a rate
region under the strong secrecy criterion.
In this paper, we consider Compound Multiple Access
Channel with Confidential Messages (CMAC-CM). Actually,
in wireless networks, there may be a scenario in which some
of the users have confidential information that wish to be
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Fig. 1 Compound Multiple Access Channel with Confidential Mes-
sages (CMAC-CM)
kept secret from illegal users. In fact, in terms of information
the users can be divided into legitimate and illegal users.
Legitimate users are allowed to decode all the transmitted
information (including common and private messages of all
the transmitters), while illegal users are allowed to decode only
the messages of their intended transmitters. Motivated by this
scenario, we consider CMAC-CM as a building block of this
setting. In this model, while each of the transmitters sends its
own private message, both of them have a common message.
One of the transmitters’ private message (W1) is confidential
and only decoded by the first receiver and kept secret from
the second receiver. The common message W0 and private
message W2 are decoded by both receivers (see Fig. 1). For
this model we derive single letter inner and outer bounds on
the secrecy capacity region. We also consider two examples
for this channel: Less noisy and Gaussian CMAC-CM.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system
model is described. In Section III, an outer bound on the
secrecy capacity region of CMAC-CM and also an achievable
secrecy rate region for CMAC-CM are derived. Two examples
are given in Section IV. The paper is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a discrete memoryless CMAC-CM with four-
terminals as shown in Fig. 1. The finite sets X1,X2,Y1,Y2
and the transition probability distribution p(y1, y2|x1, x2) are
the constitutive components of this channel. Here, X1 and
X2 are the channel inputs from the transmitters. Also Y1 and
Y2 are the channel outputs at the receiver 1 and receiver 2,
respectively. Throughout this paper, the random variables
are denoted by capital letters e.g., X, Y, and their realiza-
tions by lower case letters e.g. x, y. The set of ε−strongly
jointly typical sequences of length n, on joint distribution
p(x, y) is denoted by Anε (PX,Y ). We use X
n
i , to indicate
vector (Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,n), and Xki,j to indicate vector
(Xi,j , Xi,j+1, . . . , Xi,k). Before discussing the achievability
rate, we first define a code for the channel as follows.
Definition 1: A (M0,M1,M2, n, Pne ) code for the CMAC-
CM (Fig. 1) consists of the following: i) Two message sets
(W0,W1) and (W0,W2) that are uniformly distributed over
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[1 :M0]×[1 :M1] and [1 :M0]×[1 :M2], respectively, where
messages Wu ∈ Wu = {1, 2, ...,Mu} and u = 0, 1, 2. Note
that W0, W1 and W2 are independent. ii) A stochastic encoder
f for transmitter 1 is specified by the matrix of conditional
probability f(Xn1 |w0, w1), where Xn1 ∈ Xn1 , w0 ∈ W0,
w1 ∈ W1 are channel input, common and private message
sets respectively, and
∑
Xn1
f(Xn1 |w0, w1) = 1. Note that
f(Xn1 |w0, w1) is the probability of encoding message pair
(w0, w1) to the channel input Xn1 . iii) A deterministic encoder
g for transmitter 2 which is the mapping g :W0×W2 → Xn2
for generating codewords Xn2 = g(w0, w2). iv) A decoding
function φ : Yn1 →W0×W1×W2 at the receiver 1 that assigns
(Ŵ01, Ŵ11, Ŵ21) ∈ [1 :M0]× [1 :M1]× [1 :M2] to received
sequence yn1 . v) A decoding function ρ : Yn2 →W0 ×W2, at
the receiver 2 that assigns (Ŵ02, Ŵ22) ∈ [1 : M0] × [1 : M2]
to received sequence yn2 . The probability of error is defined
as,
Pne = Pr(Ŵ0j 6=W0 for j = 1, 2 or
Ŵ11 6=W1 or Ŵ2j 6=W2 for j = 1, 2). (1)
The ignorance level of receiver 2 with respect to the confi-
dential message is measured by the normalized equivocation
1
nH(W1|Y n2 ).
Definition 2: A rate tuple (R0, R1, R2) is said to be
achievable for CMAC-CM, if for any δ > 0 there exists a
(M0,M1,M2, n, P
n
e ) code as
Pne < ε (2)
M0 ≥ 2nR0 ,M1 ≥ 2nR1 ,M2 ≥ 2nR2 (3)
R1 − 1
n
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≤ δ (4)
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Outer Bound
Theorem 1: (Outer bound) The secrecy capacity region for
the CMAC-CM is included in the set of rates satisfying
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} (5)
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U, V2)− I(V1;Y2|U, V2) (6)
R2 ≤ min{I(V2;Y1), I(V2;Y2)} (7)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|U, V2) (8)
for some joint distribution
p(u)p(v1, v2|u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2|x1, x2). (9)
Remark 1: If we set W2 = ∅ and thus R2 = 0 in
Theorem 1, the region reduces to the region of the broadcast
channel with confidential messages discussed in [2] by Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner.
Proof (Theorem 1): We next show that any achievable rate
tuples satisfies (5)-(8) for some distribution factorized as (9).
Consider a code (M0,M1,M2, n, Pne ) for the CMAC-CM.
Applying Fano’s inequality [11] results in
H(W0,W1,W2|Y n1 ) ≤ nε1 (10)
H(W0,W2|Y n2 ) ≤ nε2 (11)
We first derive the bound on R1. Note that the perfect
secrecy (4) implies that
nR1 − nδ ≤ H(W1|Y n2 ). (12)
Hence, we derive the bound on H(W1|Y n2 ) as following:
H(W1|Y n2 ) = H(W1|Y n2 ,W0,W2) + I(W1;W0,W2|Y n2 )
= H(W1|Y n2 ,W0,W2) +H(W0,W2|Y n2 )
−H(W0,W2|Y n2 ,W1)
≤ H(W1|Y n2 ,W0,W2) + nε2
≤ H(W1|Y n2 ,W0,W2)−H(W1|Y n1 ,W0,W2)
+ nε1 + nε2 (13)
where the first and the second inequality are due to Fano’s
inequalities. Now, based on (13) we have
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≤ I(W1;Y n1 |W0,W2)
− I(W1;Y n2 |W0,W2) + nε
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W2)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2)] + nε
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W2)
− I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W1,W2)
− I(W1, Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2)
+ I(Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W1,W2)] + nε
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W2)
+ I(W1;Y1,i|Y n2,i+1, Y i−11 ,W0,W2)
− I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W1,W2)
− I(Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Y i−11 ,W0,W2)
+ I(Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W1,W2)] + nε
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Y n2,i+1, Y i−11 ,W0,W2)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Y i−11 ,W0,W2)] + nε
where ε = ε1 + ε2. The last equality is due to [2, Lemma 7]
where:
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W2) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2) (14)
and
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W1,W2) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W1,W2). (15)
So, we have
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Ui, V2,i)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Ui, V2,i)] + nε
=
n∑
i=1
[I(V1,i;Y1,i|Ui, V2,i)− I(V1,i;Y2,i|Ui, V2,i)] + nε
(16)
where the equalities resulting from the following definitions
of the random variables
Ui = Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ,W0 (17)
V1,i = (Ui,W1) (18)
V2,i = (Ui,W2). (19)
Now, we have
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≤ n
n∑
i=1
1
n
[I(V1,Q;Y1,Q|UQ, V2,Q, Q = i)
− I(V1,Q;Y2,Q|UQ, V2,Q, Q = i)] + nε
= n
n∑
i=1
p(Q = i)[I(V1,Q;Y1,Q|UQ, V2,Q, Q = i)
− I(V1,Q;Y2,Q|UQ, V2,Q, Q = i)] + nε
= n[I(V1,Q;Y1,Q|UQ, V2,Q, Q)
− I(V1,Q;Y2,Q|UQ, V2,Q, Q)] + nε
= n[I(V1;Y1|U, V2)− I(V1;Y2|U, V2)] + nε (20)
where V1,Q = V1, V2,Q = V2, Y1,Q = Y1, Y2,Q =
Y2, (UQ, Q) = U and Q has a uniform distribution over
{1, 2, ..., n} outcomes. Now, we derive the bound on R2 as
following:
nR2 = H(W2) = H(W2|W0)
= I(W2;Y
n
1 |W0) +H(W2|Y n1 ,W0)
≤ I(W2;Y n1 |W0) + nε1 (21)
where the second equality results from independence of
W0,W1,W2, and the inequality is due to the Fano’s inequality.
Now, based on (21)
nR2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0) + nε1
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0) + nε1
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2,W0, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i) + nε1
=
n∑
i=1
I(V2,i, Ui;Y1,i) + nε1 (22)
where the last equality follows from (17) and (19). Now, we
have
R2 ≤
n∑
i=1
1
n
[I(V2,i, Ui;Y1,i)] + nε1
=
n∑
i=1
1
n
[I(V2,Q, UQ;Y1,Q|Q = i)] + nε1
=
n∑
i=1
p(Q = i)[I(V2,Q, UQ;Y1,Q|Q = i)] + nε1
= I(V2,Q, UQ;Y1,Q|Q) + nε1
= I(V2,Q, UQ, Q;Y1,Q) + nε1
= I(V2,Q;Y1,Q) + I(UQ;Y1,Q|V2,Q)
+ I(Q;Y1,Q|V2,Q, UQ) + nε1
= I(V2,Q;Y1,Q) + nε1
= I(V2;Y1) + nε1 (23)
where fourth equality result from independence of Q and YQ.
Sixth equality is due to I(UQ;Y1,Q|V2,Q) = 0 (see (17) and
(19)), and I(Q;Y1,Q|V2,Q, UQ) = 0 since Q is independent of
Y1,Q. The last equality results by setting V2,Q = V2, Y1,Q =
Y1.
On the other hand, we have:
nR2 = H(W2) = H(W2|W0)
= I(W2;Y
n
2 |W0) +H(W2|Y n2 ,W0)
≤ I(W2;Y n2 |W0) + nε2 (24)
where the inequality is due to the Fano’s inequality. Next, we
have
nR2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0) + nε2
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Y
i−1
1 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0) + nε2
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ,W0;Y2,i) + nε2
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui, V2,i;Y2,i) + nε2 (25)
where the last equality follows from (17) and (19). Now, by
applying the same time-sharing strategy as (23) we have
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2). (26)
Now, we derive the bound on n(R1 +R2) as following:
n(R1 +R2) = H(W1,W2) = H(W1,W2|W0)
= I(W1,W2;Y
n
1 |W0) +H(W1,W2|Y n1 ,W0)
≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1 |W0) + nε1
where the inequality is due to the Fano’s inequality. Now, we
have
n(R1 +R2) ≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1 |W0)
− (H(W1)−H(W1|Y n2 )− nδ) + nε1
= I(W1,W2;Y
n
1 |W0)−H(W1|W0,W2)
+H(W1|Y n2 ) + n(ε1 + δ)
= I(W1,W2;Y
n
1 |W0)−H(W1|W0,W2)
+H(W1|Y n2 ,W0,W2)
+ I(W1;W0,W2|Y n2 ) + n(ε1 + δ)
≤ I(W1,W2;Y n1 |W0)
− I(W1;Y n2 |W0,W2) + nε2 + n(ε1 + δ)
where the first inequality is a consequence of (4) and the last
inequality is due to the Fano’s inequality. We also define ε3 =
ε1 + ε2 + δ. So, we have
n(R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1,W2;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2)] + nε3
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1,W2, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0)
− I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0,W1,W2)
− I(W1, Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2)
+ I(Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W1,W2)] + nε3
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1,W2, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0)
− I(W1, Y i−11 ;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W0,W2)] + nε3
where the last equality is a consequence of (15). Hence, we
have
n(R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1,W2, Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 ,W0)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Y i−11 ,W0,W2)] + nε3
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W0,W1,W2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Y i−11 ,W0,W2)] + nε3.
Now, we have
n(R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui, V1,i, V2,i;Y1,i)
− I(V1,i;Y2,i|Ui, V2,i)] + nε3
where the inequality follows from (17)-(19). Now, by applying
the same time-sharing strategy as before, we have:
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|U, V2). (27)
Now, we derive the bound on R0 as following:
nR0 = H(W0) = I(W0;Y
n
1 ) +H(W0|Y n1 )
≤ I(W0;Y n1 ) + nε1
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0;Y1,i|Y i−11 ) + nε1
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W0, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i)− I(Y i−11 ;Y1,i)] + nε1.
So, we have
nR0 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i) + nε1
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W0, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i)
− I(Y n2,i+1;Y1,i|W0, Y i−11 )] + nε1
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i) + nε1
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y1,i) + nε1.
Now, by applying the same time-sharing strategy as before,
we have
R0 ≤ I(U ;Y1) + ε1. (28)
Similarly
R0 ≤ I(U ;Y2) + ε2. (29)
Therefore
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}. (30)
Considering (12), (20),(23),(26),(27) and (30), the region in
(5)-(8) is obtained. This completes the proof.
B. Achievability
Theorem 2: An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region
is given by:
⋃

R0 ≥ 0 , R1 ≥ 0 , R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|X2, U)− I(V1;Y2|X2, U)
R2 ≤ min{I(X2;Y1|V1, U), I(X2;Y2|U)}
R0 +R2 ≤ I(U,X2;Y2)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, X2;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|X2, U)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, X2;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|X2, U)
(31)
where the union is taken over all probability
distributions of the form p(u, v1, x1, x2, y1, y2) =
p(u)p(v1|u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|u)p(y1, y2|x1, x2).
Remark 2: If we convert our model to a multiple access
channel with correlated sources by setting Y2 = ∅ and V1 =
X1 in Theorem 2, the region reduces to the region of the
multiple access channel with correlated sources discussed in
[12] by Slepian and Wolf.
Remark 3: If we set X2 = ∅ in Theorem 2, the region
includes the region of the broadcast channel with confidential
messages discussed in [2] by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner.
Proof (Theorem 2): Fix p(u), p(v1|u), p(x1|v1) and
p(x2|u).
1) Codebook generation:
i) Generate 2nR0 codewords un, each is uniformly drawn
from the set Anε (PU ) indexing by u
n(w0), w0 ∈
{1, ..., 2nR0}.
ii) For each codeword un(w0), generate 2nR˜ codewords vn1
each is uniformly drawn from the set A(n)ε (PV1|U ), where
R˜ = R1 + I(V1;Y2|X2, U) − ε. Then, randomly bin
the 2nR˜ codewords into 2nR1 bins and label them as
vn1 (w0, w1, l). Here, w1 is the bin number and l ∈ L =
{1, ..., 2n(I(V1;Y2|X2,U)−ε)} is the index of codewords in
the bin number w1.
iii) For each codeword un(w0), generate 2nR2 codewords
xn2 (w0, w2) each is uniformly drawn from the set
A
(n)
ε (PX2|U ), and label them as x
n
2 (w0, w2), w2 ∈
{1, ..., 2nR2}.
2) Encoding: To send the message pair (w0, w1), the
encoder f first randomly chooses index l corresponding to
(w0, w1) and then, generates a codeword Xn1 at random
according to
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i|v1,i). Transmitter 2 uses the deter-
ministic encoder for sending (w0, w2) and sends codeword
xn2 (w0, w2).
3) Decoding and Probability of error:
• Receiver 1 declares that the indices of
(ŵ01, ŵ11, ŵ21) has been sent if there is a
unique tuple of indices (ŵ01, ŵ11, ŵ21) such that
(un(ŵ01), v
n
1 (ŵ01, ŵ11, l), x
n
2 (ŵ01, ŵ21), y
n
1 ) ∈
Anε (PUV1X2Y1).
• Receiver 2 declares that the index pair of (ŵ02, ŵ22) has
been sent if there is a unique pair of indices (ŵ02, ŵ22)
such that (un(ŵ02), xn2 (ŵ02, ŵ22), y
n
2 ) ∈ Anε (PUX2Y2).
Using joint decoding [11], it can be shown that the proba-
bility of error goes to zero as n→∞ if we choose:
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|X2, U)− I(V1;Y2|X2, U) (32)
R2 ≤ min{I(X2;Y1|V1, U), I(X2;Y2|U)} (33)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(U,X2;Y2) (34)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, X2;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|X2, U) (35)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V1, X2;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|X2, U) (36)
4) Equivocation computation:
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≥ H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 , Un)
= H(W1, Y
n
2 |Xn2 , Un)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 , Un)
= H(W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
1 |Xn2 , Un)
−H(V n1 |W1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 , Un)
= H(W1, V
n
1 |Xn2 , Un)
+H(Y n2 |W1, V n1 , Xn2 , Un)
−H(V n1 |W1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 , Un)
≥ H(V n1 |Xn2 , Un) +H(Y n2 |V n1 , Xn2 , Un)
−H(V n1 |W1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 , Un)
= H(V n1 |Un)−H(V n1 |W1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un)
− I(V n1 ;Y n2 |Xn2 , Un) (37)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that V n1 is a function
of W1 and the last equality follows from the Markov chain
V n1 − Un −Xn2 . The first term in (37) is given by:
H(V n1 |Un) = nR˜. (38)
We then show that H(V n1 |W1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un) ≤ nε1, where
as n → ∞ then ε1 → 0. Based on the Fano’s inequality, we
have:
H(V n1 |W1 = w1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un) ≤ 1 + pew1(nR˜− nR1) ≡ nε1
where pew1 specifies the average of error probability of user 1 for
decoding vn1 (w0, w1, l) given W1 = w1 and W0 = w0. Hence
H(V n1 |W1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un) =∑
w1∈W1
p(W1 = w1)H(V
n
1 |W1 = w1, Y n2 , Xn2 , Un) ≤ nε1. (39)
The last term in (37) is bounded as:
I(V n1 ;Y
n
2 |Xn2 , Un) ≤ nI(V1;Y2|X2, U) + nε2 (40)
where as n→∞, then ε2 → 0 [1, Lemma 8]. By replacing (38)-(40)
in equation (37), and setting δ = ε1 + ε2, we have:
H(W1|Y n2 ) ≥ nR˜− nε1 − nI(V1;Y2|X2, U)− nε2
= n(R˜− I(V1;Y2|X2, U))− nδ
= nR1 − nδ. (41)
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider less noisy and Gaussian CMAC-CM.
A. Less Noisy CMAC-CM
We define ’less noisy’ model as a CMAC-CM where I(V2;Y1) ≥
I(V2;Y2) for all p(v2, x2).
Theorem 3 (Outer Bound): The secrecy capacity region for the
less noisy CMAC-CM is included in the set of rates satisfying
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|V2)− I(V1;Y2|V2) (42)
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2) (43)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|V2)} (44)
for some joint distribution
p(v1, v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2|x1, x2).
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 1. If we set R0 = 0 and
define V1,i = (Y n2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ,W1) and V2,i = (Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ,W2),
we can derive (42) to (44).
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Fig. 2 Gaussian compound MAC with confidential messages.
Theorem 4 (Achievability): An inner bound on the secrecy
capacity region is given by:
⋃ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|V2)− I(V1;Y2|V2)R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2)R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|V2) (45)
where the union is taken over all joint distributions factorized as
p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2|x1, x2).
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 2 by setting U as a
constant and by replacing X2 by V2 where V2 is obtained by passing
X2 through a DMC p(v2|x2). Note that
I(V2;Y1|V1) = H(V2|V1)−H(V2|Y1, V1)
(a)
= H(V2)−H(V2|Y1, V1) = I(V2;Y1, V1)
≥ I(V2;Y1)
(b)
≥ I(V2;Y2)
where (a) happens since V1 and V2 are independent and (b)
results from considering less noisy model. Therefore, we have
min{I(V2;Y1|V1), I(V2;Y2)} = I(V2;Y2).
Note that although the outer and inner bounds for this model has
the same characteristic, they are over two different joint distributions.
B. Gaussian CMAC-CM
In this section, we consider Gaussian CMAC-CM as depicted in
Fig. 2, and extend the achievable rate region of discrete memoryless
CMAC-CM to the Gaussian case. Relationships between the inputs
and outputs of the channel are given by
Y1 =
√
h1X1 +
√
h2X2 +N1 (46)
Y2 =
√
g1X1 +
√
g2X2 +N2 (47)
where hi, gi (for i = 1, 2) are known channel gains as shown in
Fig. 2. The noise terms N1 and N2 are independent zero-mean unit-
variance complex Gaussian random variables and independent of the
real random variables X1, X2. The inputs of the channel are also
subject to an average power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2k,i] ≤ Pk k = 1, 2. (48)
Let V1, V2, X1, and X2 be jointly Gaussian random variables with
V1 =
√
PU1U +
√
PU′U
′, V2 =
√
PU2U +
√
PU′′U
′′ (49)
V1
∆
= X1, V2
∆
= X2 (50)
where U,U ′ and U ′′ are independent Gaussian zero mean unit vari-
ance random variables. The terms PU1 , PU2 , PU′ , and PU′′ denote
the corresponding power allocation, where
P1 = PU1 + PU′ , P2 = PU2 + PU′′ . (51)
Following the achievability proof for the discrete memoryless
channel, we obtain the following result for the Gaussian CMAC-CM.
Fig. 3 Achievable rate region of Gaussian CMAC-CM and the ca-
pacity region of Compound MAC for P1 = P2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 0.6,
g1 = 0.4 and g2 = 0.5.
Theorem 5: An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of
Gaussian CMAC-CM is:
⋃

R1 ≤ C(h1PU′)− C(g1PU′)
R2 ≤ min{C(h2PU′′), C( g2PU′′1+g1PU′ )}
R0 +R2 ≤ C( g1PU1+g2P2+2
√
g1g2PU1PU2
1+g1PU′
)
R1 +R2 ≤ C(h1PU′ + h2PU′′)− C(g1PU′)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ C(h1P1 + h2P2 + 2
√
h1h2PU1PU2)
−C(g1PU′)
(52)
where C(x) = (1/2) log(1 + x) and the union is taken over all
0 ≤ PU1 + PU′ ≤ P1 and 0 ≤ PU2 + PU′′ ≤ P2.
Proof: Following from Theorem 2, by choosing random variables
the same as (46)-(51) the region in (52) is derived.
Theorem 6: The capacity region of Compound Gaussian MAC is
given by:
⋃

0 ≤ R1 ≤ min{C(h1PU′), C(g1PU′)}
0 ≤ R2 ≤ min{C(h2PU′′), C(g2PU′′)}
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ min{C(h1PU′ + h2PU′′)
, C(g1PU′ + g2PU′′)}
0 ≤ R0 +R1 +R2 ≤
min{C(h1P1 + h2P2 + 2
√
h1h2PU1PU2),
C(g1P1 + g2P2 + 2
√
g1g2PU1PU2)}
(53)
where C(x) = (1/2) log(1 + x) and the union is taken over all
0 ≤ PU1 + PU′ ≤ P1 and 0 ≤ PU2 + PU′′ ≤ P2.
Proof: Considering Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 in [10] which are
outer and inner bounds on the capacity region of compound MAC
with conferencing links, then ignoring conferencing links in that
model (i.e, setting C12 = C21 = 0 in [10]), and by considering
(46) to (51), the region in (53) is derived.
As an example, for the values P1 = P2 = 1, h1 = h2 = .6,
g1 = .4 and g2 = .5 the achievable rate region in Theorem 5 and the
capacity region in Theorem 6 are depicted in Fig. 3. As it can be seen
in Fig. 3, for this scenario the achievable rate R0 (rate of W0 which
is decoded by both receivers) is nearly the same for both CMAC-
CM and compound MAC models. Moreover, the achievable rate R2
(rate of W2 which is also decoded by both receivers) is equal for
both CMAC-CM and compound MAC models. Moreover, as it can
be seen from Fig. 3, for these channel gain parameters the achievable
rate R1 for CMAC-CM is less than that for Compound MAC due to
secrecy constraint for decoding message W1.
According to (53), it is clear that if the channel gain between
transmitter 1 and receiver 2 (i.e., g1) decreases, the capacity region
of compound MAC does not increase (i.e., the capacity region may
remain as before or decreases). On the other hand, there exist
scenarios for CMAC-CM (refer to (52)) for which decreasing g1
results in increasing its achievable rate region. For comparison,
assume changing g1 = 0.4 to g1 = 0.1 in the above example. As
it can be seen in Fig. 4, the achievable rate region of CMAC-CM is
larger than the capacity region of compound MAC model for the new
parameters. This can be interpreted as follows: transmitted signal of
Fig. 4 Achievable rate region of Gaussian CMAC-CM and the
capacity region of Compound MAC P1 = P2 = 1, h1 = h2 = 0.6,
g1 = 0.1 and g2 = 0.5.
transmitter 1 is extremely attenuated at the receiver 2. So, for this
case, not forcing the receiver 2 to decode W1 (keeping W1 as a secret
for receiver 2) can increase the achievable rate region.
Also, it should be noted that according to (52), for the scenarios
where g1 equals or greater than h1, the achievable rate R1 is zero.
This happens since for these scenarios the channel gain between
transmitter 1 and receiver 2 (i.e., illegal user in terms of message
W1) is equal or better than the channel gain between transmitter 1
and receiver 1 (i.e., legitimate user in terms of message W1), and
this makes zero R1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy capacity region of the
Compound MAC with one Confidential Message (CMAC-CM). We
have obtained inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity for the
general CMAC-CM. We have further studied less noisy and Gaussian
CMAC-CM. Providing numerical examples for the Gaussian case we
have shown that there are scenarios for which keeping secret some
messages can increase the rate region compared to being required to
communicate those messages reliably to the other receiver.
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